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them on the law.” The defendant was charged with murder in the first
degree.
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M'Naghten: Right or Wrong for Florida in the
1980s? It Flunks the Test
The members of the jury listened solemnly as the judge instructed
them on the law." The defendant was charged with murder in the first
degree. There was ample evidence indicating that the defendant had,
indeed, committed the crime. In fact, he did not deny doing it. The
defense relied exclusively upon insanity to support the pleading of not
guilty. "Due to his mental condition," the defense attorney argued, "he
did not have the ability to form an intent." Psychiatrists testifying for
the defense stated that, due to his mental impairment, the defendant
could not control his actions. The prosecution, through its medical ex-
perts, countered that the defendant knew his actions were wrong.
With this testimony in mind, the jury would wrestle with the ulti-
mate decision of the sanity of the accused. In deciding the extent of the
defendant's criminal responsibility, the jury would apply the law as in-
structed by the judge.
The judge continued his charge:
A person is sane and responsible for his crime if he has a sufficient
mental capacity when the crime is committed to understand what
he is doing and to understand that his act is wrong. If at the time
of the alleged crime a defendant was by reason of mental infirmity,
disease or defect, unable to understand the nature and quality of
his act or its consequences, or, if he did understand it, was incapa-
ble of distinguishing that which is right from wrong, he was legally
insane and should be found not guilty by reason of insanity.2
Thus, the jury faced the dilemma of deciding whether the defendant
was mentally infirm to a degree which rendered him unable to recog-
nize the wrongfulness of his act. If the jury should find that the ac-
cused was infirm, but still knew the difference between right and
1. This is merely hypothetical and is not intended to represent any actual case.
2. Florida Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, approved in In re
Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 327 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1976).
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wrong, they would have no choice but to convict.
This colloquy is intended to illustrate the diverse and difficult
choice thrust upon the unwary juror deciding the insanity question in
M'Naghten3 jurisdictions. The difficulty results from the rigidity of the
M'Naghten test, which confines juror alternatives. It permits a finding
of insanity only if the accused did not know (or understand) that his
act was wrong. The test is directed toward the accused's ability to
form the required mental intent (mens rea). Mental intent must be
demonstrated if the accused is to be held responsible for his act. This
test effectively cloaks the fact finder with judicial "blinders": it pre-
cludes jurors from considering any evidence showing the defendant la-
bored under a mental disease or defect which, while not rendering him
incapable of distinguishing right from wrong, affected his ability to ra-
tionally control his behavior. This all-or-nothing approach, sometimes
referred to as the "mad or bad" doctrine,4 ignores the existence of the
grey area between sanity and insanity. According to the M'Naghten
criteria, mentally ill persons failing to meet the rigid standards of the
"right-wrong" test would be determined criminally responsible despite
their infirmities.
Florida still clings to the M'Naghten teste in deciding on the sanity
of its criminals. The rationale for continued adherence to a test deemed
unacceptable by so many medical and legal scholars, is that the court
is not convinced the rule is not the best available for measuring an
accused's mental condition., Thus, despite its intrinsic infirmities and
3. 10 Clark & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (1843) wherein the court
stated:
[T]o establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly
proved that at the time of the commission of the act, the party accused
was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind as
to not know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did
know it, that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
4. Note, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished Capacity: An Aggregate
Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PROC. 351 (1979).
5. Arnella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses:
Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLJM. L. REv. 827 (1977).
6. See, e.g., Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
924 (1979).
7. See notes 58-68 infra.
8. Piccotte v. State, 116 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 1959), appeal dismissed 364 U.S. 293
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backhanded support, the M'Naghten test still reigns supreme in the
State of Florida.
This note advocates the abrogation of this rule, which, in the opin-
ion of this writer, has failed to weather the passage of time, and which
was based on faulty premises, outmoded even at the time of the rule's
inception. This note will review the history of the M'Naghten rule and
its application in Florida. Additionally it will consider the reasoning
which necessitates abrogation. Of course, one cannot merely advocate
abrogation of one doctrine without supporting implementation of a suc-
cessor. Therefore, an examination of the potential alternatives which
have supplemented or replaced M'Naghten in other jurisdictions will
follow this analysis.
I. M'Naghten-The Best Test Available or History's Mistake?
Pre-M'Naghten Tests
The M'Naghten test has origins dating back to the Eirenarch era
of 1582 wherein William Lombard of Lincolns' Inn declared that "[i]f
a mad man or a natural fool, or a lunatic in the time of his lunacy, or a
child who apparently has no knowledge of good nor evil do kill a man,
this is no felonious act. . . for they cannot be said to have any under-
standing will." Even in this period, the law recognized that one could
not be culpable if he could not, due to mental infirmities, form the
intent to commit the crime. This attempt at civility evolved into the
"wild beast" test, which provided for exculpation if the defendant "be
wholly deprived of his understanding and memory," to such an extent
that he "doth not know what he is doing no more than . . . a wild
beast." 10 A later rule developed, formulated by the humane Sir Mat-
thew Hale, which based criminal responsibility on whether the accused
at least had the understanding of a normal child of fourteen.,,
Prior to M'Naghten, no clear formulation had emerged as a uni-
formly accepted test of criminal responsibility. Prior cases had been
decided according to the "right-wrong" dichotomy, a school of thought
(1960); Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1967).
9. Moore, Jr., M'Naghten is Dead - Or Is It? 3 Hous. L. REv. 58, 62 (1965).
10. Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 685, 764 (1724).
11. 1 Hale P.C. as cited in Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584 (1926).
1271M'Naghten in Florida
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strongly influenced by beliefs in witchcraft, phrenology, and monoma-
nia. 2 Monomania, which was predicated upon the assumption that one
idea could dominate the other cognitive aspects of the mind, was a ba-
sic precept upon which the "right-wrong" test was premised. Thus, it
was reasoned, if a person had an insane delusion, it would totally con-
trol that person.
At that point in time, however, the accuracy of these concepts was
already being questioned. Many of the legal and medical scholars rec-
ognized the intrinsic shortcomings created by such a simplistic test.
M'Naghten's case offered those scholars the opportunity to reject the
"right-wrong" test and adopt a more modern approach.
Yet in perhaps the cruelest irony in the history of the common
law, the M'Naghten court was forced to adopt these ideas (which it
recognized as being outdated) due to intense political pressure applied
by the Queen. Because no clear test had previously been promulgated,
the court's reluctant endorsement of the "right-wrong" test crystallized
the fallacious concepts into the virtual vacuum of legal precedent.13
Thus the test was outdated as it was being adopted.
M'Naghten's Case4
Daniel M'Naghten has become infamous as one of history's most
unproficient lunatics. A victim to some degree of mental impairment,
he suffered from delusions of persecution.15 He thought he was being
pursued, unjustly accused of crime, and in danger of being murdered.16
12. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 616 (2d Cir. 1966), particularly nn.
23 & 24. See also BIGGS, THE GUILTY MIND 61 (1955).
13. Id.
14. 8 Eng. Rep. 718. The name "M'Naghten" is sometimes incorrectly spelled as
"M'Naughton". When this error was committed by The London Times, Justice Frank-
furter wrote to the editors correcting them. The Times replied that its spelling was
based on the spelling "signed by the man himself" in signing a letter. The Justice
replied, in typical Frankfurtian humor, "To what extent is a lunatic's spelling of his
own name to be deemed an authority?" OF LAW AND LIFE AND OTHER THINGS THAT
MATTER: PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER, 1956-1963 1-4 (Kurland
ed. 1964). See also 357 F.2d at 608.
15. See Ellison & Haas, A Recent Judicial Interpretation of the M'Naghten
Rule, 4 BRIT. JOUR. OF DELINQUENCY 129 (1953).
16. This diagnosis was reached by GUrTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY
4
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As a result of these delusions, in which Robert Peel, the English Prime
Minister was the chief culprit, M'Naghten was driven to murder. To
carry out his plan, M'Naghten stalked the Prime Minister and waited
for him outside his carriage. However, in his effort to kill the Prime
Minister, M'Naghten instead shot and killed Peel's secretary, Drum-
mond, who happened to be riding in the carriage of the Prime Minister
that day.
The obvious defense was insanity. Unbeknownst to those involved,
the methods used and result reached by the M'Naghten court would
influence similar defendants for over a hundred years. This trial be-
came the setting for an attempt to utilize new psychological studies
which, it was felt, would aid in creating a realistic formula for deter-
mining criminal responsibility. M'Naghten's defense counsel relied
heavily on a recent psychological work which contained new ap-
proaches to the subject of criminal responsibility in general, and in par-
ticular, criticized the "right-wrong" test.17 This work impressed Lord
Chief Justice Tindal with its logical insight into the workings of the
human mind, as well as its theories on behavior. This convinced him of
M'Naghten's incompetency to such an extent that he practically di-
rected a verdict for the accused.""
As a consequence of the finding of "not guilty by reason of in-
sanity," the Queen, who was quite angry with the verdict, summoned
the court before the House of Lords to clarify the law in such cases.
Her motivation stemmed from a rash of assassination attempts on the
Royal Family, including three aimed at the Queen herself. Faced with
an atmosphere of intense pressure,19 Lord Chief Justice Tindal spoke
for the court. In responding to queries submitted by the House of
Lords, Tindal reaffirmed the "right-wrong" test20 despite the fact that
AND THE LAW 403 (1952).
17. The famous work relied upon was I. RAY, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF IN-
SANITY (1838).
18. 357 F.2d at 617. See BIGGS, supra note 12, at 102.
19. Id. citing to S. GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 162-
63 (1925).
20. The Lord Chief Justice stated:
We have to submit our opinion to be that the jury ought to be told in all
cases that every man is to be presumed to be sane, and to possess a suffi-
cient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary
1 :1 
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he felt it outmoded. In so doing, he turned his back on the work of Dr.
Ray2 which had impressed him so greatly at the trial. As a result, the
strides science had made in attempting to more adequately understand
the mind were virtually nullified, and the legal test for insanity in crim-
inal cases continued to focus on the accused's knowledge of right from
wrong. Thus, this brave attempt to forge a more significant and accu-
rate legal test was frustrated. In time, this test was adopted in every
state 2 except New Hampshire," whose supreme court was also im-
pressed with the work of Dr. Ray.
be proven to their satisfaction; and that to establish a defense on the
ground of insanity it must be clearly proved that, at the time of the com-
mitting of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a defect of
reason from disease of the mind as not to know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was
doing what was wrong. The mode of putting the latter part of the question
to the jury on these occassions has generally been, whether the accused at
the time of doing the act knew the difference between right and wrong,
which mode, though rarely, if ever, leading to any mistake with the jury, is
not, as we conceive, so accurate, when put generally and in the abstract, as
when put with reference to the party's knowledge of right and wrong in
respect to the very act with which he is charged. If the question were to be
put as to the knowledge of the accused solely and exclusively with refer-
ence to the law of the land, it might tend to confound the jury by inducing
them to believe-that an actual knowledge of the law of the land was essen-
tial in order to lead to a conviction; whereas the law is administered upon
the principle that everyone must be taken conclusively to know it, without
proof that he does know it. If the accused was conscious that the act was
one which he ought not to do, and if that act was at the same time con-
trary to the law of the land, he is punishable; and the usual course, there-
fore, has been to leave the question to the jury whether the party accused
had a sufficient degree of reason to know that he was doing an act that was
wrong; and this course, we think, is correct, accompanied with such obser-
vations and explanations as the circumstances of each particular case may
require.
8 Eng. Rep. at 722. See Annot., 44 A.L.R. 584-85 (1926) for a general discussion.
21. See note 17 supra.
22. The United States Supreme Court recognized the test in Davis v. United
States, 165 U.S. 373 (1897).
23. State v. Pike, 6 A.R. 533, 49 N.H. 399 (1870). See also State v. Jones, 50
N.H. 369 (1871), wherein the court stated that the defendant was not guilty by reason
of insanity if his crime "was the offspring of product of mental disease .... "Id. at
398.
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But the die had been cast. Despite its receding acceptability in the
scientific community, the "right-wrong" test, now synonymous with
M'Naghten, was chisled into the stone of the common law. Thus sanity
was, and is, being decided according to psychological understanding
circa 16th century!
M'Naghten - Florida's Test
The M'Naghten test was expressly adopted in Florida in 1902.24
Despite periodic attacks 5 the courts have continued to lend vitality to
the doctrine as "the best available rule for determining the question of
the legal accountability of the accused for his criminal act . . ."26
This adherence has not been evidenced by a wholehearted commit-
ment, however. For example, in 1973, when the court was again asked
to review M'Naghten's viability, the test received a backhanded affirm-
ance because of a "lack of a better alternative. 27
While virtually unchanged since its inception, the M'Naghten test
was altered by the inclusion of the terms "disease or defect"28 in defin-
ing the types of infirmities which would, if affecting the person's ability
to differentiate right from wrong, deny criminal responsibility. In light
of the current criticisms of the test's rationality, this judicial attempt to
resuscitate the doctrine seems belated and misses the mark. Despite
several strong challenges, the test remains intact.29 The first of these
occurred in Reid v. Florida Real Estate Commission."0 The Second
24. Davis v. State, 44 Fla. 32, 32 So. 822 (Fla. 1902).
25. See notes 58-68 infra.
26. Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. 1969), cert. dismissed, 400
U.S. 801 (1970). But see Anderson v. State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973) (Ervin, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ervin, who had previously concurred in Campbell, proposed aban-
doning M'Naghten in favor of the MODEL PENAL CODE test.
27. 276 So. 2d at 18.
28. See Wheeler v. State, 344 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1977) cert. denied, 440 U.S.
924 (1979). The terms "disease or defect" were part of the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.01(1) (Final Draft 1966).
29. See Van Eaton v. State, 205 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1967); Wheeler v. State, 344
So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1977); Campbell v. State, 227 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 1977); Anderson v.
State, 276 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1973).
30. 188 So. 2d 846 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). This opinion was later ex-
pressly disapproved of. 205 So. 2d 298 (1967).
1311
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District Court of Appeal stated:
A person otherwise sane and competent may nevertheless be under
a lawful mental disability so as to be incapable of formulating a
rational intent to do a particular act at a particular time. Thus
legal 'insanity' which incapacitates from civil responsibility and ex-
onerates from crime is a mental deficiency with reference to the
particular act in question, although it may not be a general
incapacity.
[A] person is entitled to acquittal on the ground of mental incapac-
ity if at the time of the commission of the act he either did not
know the difference between right and wrong or he was unable to
refrain from doing wrong. . . . Thus if it is established from the
evidence that as the result of some mental defect or disease a per-
son was unable to refrain from doing wrong . . . he could not be
held criminally responsible notwithstanding he did not deny . . .
that he knew the difference between right and wrong.31
This was a radical stand in view of the historical rigidity with
which the state supreme court had clung to M'Naghten. The court not
only utilized the irresistible impulse rationale, 2 but also allowed that
the incapacity need only be partial. This nonconformance may be par-
tially explained by the sympathy evoking fact situation. Kathleen Reid,
a 49 year old real estate broker, was arrested and convicted of shoplift-
ing after lifting a three dollar steak from a supermarket. Apparently,
the woman was suffering from mental infirmities created by the onset
of menopause. As a result of her conviction, the Florida Real Estate
Commission had revoked her broker's license. The appellate court
reversed the conviction concluding that she lacked the capacity to form
the requisite legal intent and her license should not, therefore, be
suspended.
Although this decision contained elements which modified the
M'Naghten test in a positive manner, and could have opened the door
for a more modern approach to the conundrum, the Florida Supreme
Court nevertheless disapproved unanimously.33
Most of the United States Circuit Courts of Appeal have dis-
31. Id. at 854 (emphasis supplied)(footnotes omitted).
32. See notes 69-72 infra.
33. 205 So. 2d 298.
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carded M'Naghtens4 with the Fifth Circuit joining the fold in Blake v.
United States decided in 1969. 35 In Blake, the court attempted to find
a definition of insanity "more nearly attuned to present day concepts of
psychiatry." 36 There the defendant had been charged with bank rob-
bery37 and relied on the defense of insanity. The lower court had
charged the jury according to the standard definition of insanity.38
However, the appellate court felt the M'Naghten test was outmoded
and sought to replace it with the "substantial capacity" language of the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code (M.P.C.) Test. 9
After carefully considering the alternatives, the court adopted the
M.P.C. test because, "[m]odifying the lack of mental capacity by the
adjective 'substantial', still leaves the matter for the jury under the evi-
dence, lay and expert, to determine mental defect vel non and its rela-
tionship to the conduct in question. A substantial lack of capacity is a
more nearly adequate standard." 40
As a result of this decision, a defendant who commits a federal
offense will be judged according to the more liberal insanity test. The
divergent results thus created exemplify the ludicrous inconsistency
precipitated by utilizing such different tests."1
34. Those circuits which have replaced M'Naghten with a modified or complete
version of § 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE are: United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d
969, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 624 (2d Cir.
1966); United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 774 (3d Cir. 1961); United States v.
Chandler, 393 F.2d 920, 926 (4th Cir. 1968); Blake v. United States, 407 F.2d 908,
915 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Smith, 404 F.2d 720, 727 (6th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Shapiro, 383 F.2d 680, 685-88 (7th Cir. 1967); United States v. Fra-
zier, 458 F.2d 911, 917 (8th Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 65 (9th
Cir. 1970); Wion v. United States, 325 F.2d 420, 430 (10th Cir. 1963).
35. 407 F.2d 908.
36. Id. at 909.
37. This was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (1964).
38. This standard definition was based upon dictum in Davis v. United States,
165 U.S. 373 (1897), and was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in Howard v. United
States, 232 F.2d 274, 275 (5th Cir. 1956)(en banc).
39. See notes 79-84 infra.
40. 407 F.2d at 915. Also, the court adopted the alternative term "wrongfulness"
to be used instead of "criminality."
41. Section 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE could be adopted by either the
courts or by the legislature. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd
1962).
1331M'Naghten in Florida
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The next frontal attack on M'Naghten occurred in 1973 as a
closely divided Florida Supreme Court again affirmed the doctrine.
The case of Anderson v. State,42 was not factually unlike any other
challenge which had arisen in the past. In this instance, however, three
members of the seven member panel dissented, finding the current test
outmoded as applied.43 Relying heavily on the logic asserted in United
States v. Freeman,4 the dissenters attempted to vitiate the test and
proposed the adoption of the M.P.C. test.45 The opinions of Justices
Ervin and Boyd indicated strong discomfort with M'Naghten. Justice
Ervin felt that:
In this age of increasing psychiatric sophistication, it is naive to
believe a determination as to a person's sanity can be made solely
on the basis of his ability to distinguish right from wrong. A jury
should be given a defendant's entire mental record if he raises the
issue of his sanity. . . .In addition, the jury should be charged in
a manner which would allow it to find a defendant not guilty by
reason of insanity not only when he does not know what he is doing
is wrong but also when he cannot control his actions because of a
mental disease. I believe the time has come to discard M'Naghten
46
Similarly, Justice Boyd concluded: "[s]urely with all the modern
advances in court procedures and the abandonment of antiquated ap-
proaches to justice the time has come to adopt a better standard than
the M'Naghten rule . . . . "4 Interestingly enough, despite Justice
Boyd's strong dissent, when the question was again raised in Wheeler v.
State,4 he concurred with the majority leaving Justices Adkins and
England (two additions since the Anderson decision) as the only dis-
senters. In Wheeler the court retained M'Naghten but supplemented it
with the "disease or defect" language from the M.P.C.49
42. 276 So. 2d 17.
43. Id. at 19 (Ervin, J. dissenting).
44. 357 F.2d 606.
45. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (final draft 1966) at note 80 infra.
46. 276 So. 2d at 23.
47. Id. at 24.
48. 344 So. 2d 244.
49. See note 28 supra.
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In 1973, M'Naghten was challenged on constitutional grounds.
The appellant in Walker v. State5" urged that the M'Naghten test was
arbitrary, unreasonable and denied an accused his substantive due pro-
cess rights. The court dismissed this argument in cursory fashion. Thus
another attempt at abrogating the test had fallen short of the mark.
In 1977 the Florida legislature attempted to make the insanity is-
sue clearer for the jury by creating the bifurcated trial system. 1 The
bifurcated trial system had been tried in'several states52 in an effort to
provide greater safeguards for the defendant. The system provided that
the issue of guilt-innocence be tried prior to the issue of insanity, in a
completely separate hearing, thereby avoiding the potential prejudice
50. 284 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
51. FLA. STAT. § § 921.131 [918.017] (1977). Section one of this statute reads:
Separate proceedings on issue of insanity.
(1) When in a criminal case it shall be the intention of the defendant
to plead not guilty and to rely on the defense of insanity, no evidence of
insanity shall be admitted until it is determined through trial or by plea
whether the defendant is guilty or innocent of committing or attempting to
commit the alleged criminal act. Advance notice of intention to rely upon
the defense of insanity shall be given by the defendant as provided by rule.
Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of the-commission or attempted
commission of the cirminal act, a trial shall be promptly held, either by
the same trial jury, if applicable, or by a new jury, in the discretion of the
court, solely on the question of whether the defendant was sane at the time
the criminal act was committed or attempted. The defendant shall have
the option, with approval of the court, of waiving the jury trial on the issue
of insanity and allowing the determination of sanity to be made by the
judge. Evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems
relevant to the issue of sanity regardless of its admissibility under the ex-
clusionary rules of evidence, except as prohibited by the Constitutions of
the United States or State of Florida; provided, however, that the defen-
dant is given the opportunity to rebut any such evidence. If the jury or the
judge shall determine that the defendant was guilty of committing or at-
tempting to commit the criminal act and was sane at the time, then the
court shall proceed as provided by law. If it is determined that the defen-
dant was guilty of committing or attempting to commit the criminal act
but was insane at the time, the court shall adjudicate the defendant not
guilty by reason of insanity.
52. At one time, Arizona, California, Colorado, Louisiana, Texas, Wisconsin and
Wyoming all used the bifurcated trial system. See, e.g., CoLo. REv. STAT. § 16-8-104
(1973).
135 1M'Naghten in Florida16: 1981
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which could result from the introduction of the wide range of evidence
relevant to an insanity defense.53
Despite its noble intent, the Florida Supreme Court struck down
the statute concluding that it violated a defendant's due process
rights."4 The court pointed out that under the statute
[s]anity is, in effect presumed, giving rise to an irrebuttable pre-
sumption of the existence of the requisite intent. Thus, the state is
relieved of its burden of proving each element beyond a reasonable
doubt because the defendant is precluded from offering evidence to
negate the presumption of intent. . . . [Prohibiting] the introduc-
tion of any or all evidence bearing on proof of insanity at the trial
of guilt or innocence. . . deprive[s] a defendant of the opportunity
of rebutting intent, premeditation, and malice, because an insane
person could have none. 55
Thus another attempt at altering the insanity defense had failed.
Those relying on the defense of insanity did receive token judicial
relief in State v. Roberts,58 where the Lyles rule 57 was adopted. The
rule states that when an accused relies on the insanity defense, the jury
must be told of the consequences following a finding of "not guilty by
reason of insanity"; i.e. confinement and supervision in a mental hospi-
tal. Thus the court helped inform jurors, previously unaware, of the
consequences attaching to their verdict.
Although this additional step does make the M'Naghten test some-
what more palatable, it nonetheless fails to mollify the test's harsh re-
sults. In the final analysis, Florida retains a test to determine an ac-
cused's ability to form a cognitive mens rea - a determination which is
not medically, scientifically or legally proficient in the current era of
modern psychiatry.
53. See Comment, Due Process and Bifurcated Trials: A Double-Edged Sword,
66 Nw. U.L. REv. 327 (1971).
54. Boyd v. Green, 355 So. 2d 789 (Fla. 1978). See State v. Shaw, 106 Ariz.
103, 471 P.2d 715 (1970), and Sanchez v. State, 567 P.2d 270 (Wyo. 1977), wherein
both courts invalidated the bifurcated trial system on similar grounds.
55. 355 So. 2d at 79.3-94 (citations omitted).
56. 335 So. 2d 285.
57. Lyles v. United States, 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
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The Critics Attack
The most fundamental criticism of the M'Naghten test is the nar-
row scope of behavior it addresses: the cognitive, rather than volitional,
aspects of an accused's personality are the sole factors considered in
determining sanity.58 Thus, sanity is gauged according to whether the
accused knows the difference between right and wrong while the degree
of his awareness and the ability to control his behavior are rendered
immaterial. "This is an anathema to modern psychiatry."5 9 It creates
a situation in which the jury may acquit, and thereby hospitalize, only
those who are unable to distinguish between right and wrong. Those
who suffer from mental infirmities and are unable to control their be-
havior must be found guilty.
The net result is a disservice to society. Mentally deficient people,
not insane according to M'Naghten, are incarcerated rather than
treated in hospitals and return to the mainstream of society untreated.
In recognizing this principle, it was stated that:
Because M'Naghten unrealistically considered mentally ill only
those who are unable to distinguish right from wrong, many defen-
dants with severe mental defects receive guilty rather than not
guilty by reason of insanity verdicts. This does nothing to accom-
plish the two goals of criminal punishment, the maximum rehabili-
tation of criminals, and the protection of society, against crime
... . [Thus mentally] ill defendants are found guilty ...and
placed in prisons without psychiatric facilities; mental rehabilita-
tion is impossible. When they have finished serving their sentences,
they are released to society uncured and ready to unwittingly com-
mit another crime.60
This potential for recidivism is a problem inherent in the treatment
afforded those failing the test, and can only be corrected by a more
58. See, e.g., Note, Criminal Law The A.L.I. Model Penal Code Insanity Test
44 TUL. L. REv. 192 (1969), Note, The Legal Standard for Determining Criminal
Insanity: A Need for Reform, 20 DRAKE L. REV. 353 (1971), Platt, Choosing a Test
for Criminal Insanity, 5 WILLAIETTE L.J. 553 (1969); 276 So. 2d at 22.
59. 276 So. 2d at 22.
60. Id. at 22-23, citing Diamond, Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 14
STANFORD L. REv. 59 (1961). See, e.g., BIGGS, supra note 14, at 24.
137 1
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liberal application of standards in determining criminal responsibility.
A secondary defect which further debilitates the effectiveness of
M'Naghten results from the unnecessarily great demarcation of expert
psychiatric testimony. 1 As a result,
[w]hen the law limits a testifying psychiatrist to stating his opinion
whether the accused is capable of knowing right from wrong, the
expert is thereby compelled to test guilt or innocence by a concept
which bears little relationship to reality. He is required, thus to
consider one aspect of the mind as a 'logic tight compartment in
which the delusion holds sway leaving the balance of the mind in-
tact .... '62
Psychiatrists who must couch their responses in the "right-wrong"
context when testifying, find themselves in a frustrating, if not profes-
sionally onerous situation. The test is too confining for a science as infi-
nite as psychiatry. This sentiment was illustrated by Dr. Lawrence
Kolb who stated that "answers supplied by a psychiatrist in regard to
questions of rightness or wrongness of an act or 'knowing' its nature
constitute a professional perjury."6 The "right-wrong" dichotomy does
not adequately lend itself to the complicated diagnosis which the craft
demands.
This leads to another deleterious effect M'Naghten has on the effi-
ciency of psychiatric testimony, that being inhibition in communicating
knowledge concerning the accused's disease or defect. Too often this
results in the psychiatrist talking about mental illness and the attorney
talking in terms of "right and wrong. 64 This can only serve to further
confuse the jury, making its task of ultimately deciding on the defen-
dant's sanity that much tougher.
The unpopularity of the test became evident when a group of psy-
chiatrists was polled.6 5 Seventy-nine percent believed the M'Naghten
61. United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966).
62. Id. at 619 citing GLLIECK, supra note 19, at 169-70.
63. Remarks, Annual Judicial Conference, Insanity as a Defense, 37 F.R.D. 365,
387 (2d Cir. 1964).
64. United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 766 (3d Cir. 1961). See Gutt-
macher, The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness, 22 U. Cmi. L. REv. 325 (1955).
65. The poll was conducted through a questionnaire on medical problems sent to
members of the American Psychiatric Association. In view of the unscientific nature of
14
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test to be unsatisfactory.6" In a similar questionnaire, eighty-seven per-
cent felt the test did not present a realistic and adequate statement of
the medical facts.67 Dissatisfaction of that magnitude clearly indicates
that many in the field of psychiatry would concur in the test's abroga-
tion and would not find such a movement vituperative.
Perhaps the most pernicious result of limiting expert testimony to
the confines of the rigid "right-wrong" formula" is not that "psychia-
trists will feel constricted in artificially structuring their testimony but
rather that the ultimate deciders - the judge or the jury - will be
deprived of information vital to their final judgment."68 It can only re-
sult in a disservice for all concerned if jurors continue to render ver-
dicts based on inadequate expert testimony. In this respect, an unedu-
cated jury surely is an ignorant jury. In view of the state of the science,
inadequate education of the jury is both unfortunate and unnecessary.
Whether Florida will recognize these criticisms and relinquish ad-
herence to M'Naghten remains to be seen. In light of the strong attacks
of test opponents, the question will no doubt be raised again. As alter-
natives to M'Naghten withstand the test of time, or if some new test
evolves which evokes support, proponents will urge its adoption here.
The crux of this dilemma centers not on whether M'Naghten should be
replaced, but on what should take its place.
The Alternatives
One alternative, penned by the respected Chief Justice of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court, gained judicial impetus soon after
M'Naghten was decided. In what came to be known as the irresistible
impulse doctrine, an entirely new element, intended as a supplement to
the M'Naghten instruction, was added to the test. Chief Justice Shaw
stated:
If then it is proven to the satisfaction of the jury, that the mind of
the survey, the author recognizes the inherent inadequacies of the poll. It is cited, how-
ever, not to stress any exact formulation of opinion, but to show the basic contempt
with which many psychiatrists view the M'Naghten test.
66. Appendix B to § 4.01 of the MODEL PENAL CODE (final draft 1966).
67. 276 So. 2d at 22.
68. 357 F.2d at 620.
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the accused was in a diseased and unsound state, the question will
be, whether the disease existed to so high a degree that for the time
being it overwhelmed the reason, conscience and judgment, and
whether the prisoner, in commiting the homicide, acted from an
irresistable and uncontrollable impulse; if so, then the act was not
the act of a voluntary agent, but the involuntary act of the body,
without the concurrence of a mind directing it."
The "irresistible impulse" focus shifts away from a pure "right-
wrong" dichotomy, exculpating the defendant who acted from an inter-
nal impulse resulting from an actual existing disease of the mind,
which he could neither resist nor control. It was not intended to encom-
pass irresistible impulse produced entirely by emotion, although the
two were often mistakenly intermingled. If it could be shown (despite
an accused's knowledge that his act was wrong) he was acting on an
internal impulse caused by a diseased mind, and that he was unable to
control this impulse, grounds for acquittal were established. Despite its
acceptance in many states as a supplement to M'Naghten, this test also
received criticism as some courts questioned the viability of the
doctrine.70
Many courts view the -test, which attempted to ameliorate the
harmful results of M'Naghten, as inherently inadequate. An additional
criticism of "irresistible impulse" enunciated a doubt that the concepts
upon which the test were based even existed.71 The term implies that a
crime impulsively committed was necessarily the result of an uncontrol-
lable urge. Thus, "the 'irresistible impulse' test is unduly restrictive be-
cause it excludes the numerous instances of crimes committed after ex-
cessive brooding and melancholy by one who is unable to resist psychic
compulsion or to make any real attempt to control his conduct."72 This
leads to inconsistent verdicts where the manner in which the crime was
perpetrated becomes more important than the accused's state of mind.
69. Commonwealth v. Rogers, 7 Metc. 500, 502 (1844), as cited in WEINREB,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 393 (2d ed. 1975) (emphasis added).
70. State v. Maish, 29 Wash. 2d 52, 185 P.2d 486 (1947); State v. Witt, 342 So.
2d 497 (Fla. 1977); 357 F.2d 606. See also Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsi-
bility, 65 YALE L.J. 761 (1956).
71. 357 F.2d 606.
72. Id. at 620-21. See also Wechsler, The Criteria of Criminal Responsibility,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 367 (1955).
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Shrewd defense counsel were able to confuse juries and thus vitiate any
improvement this test had over M'Naghten.
In finding "irresistible impulse" unsatisfactory, one court con-
cluded that the test was "little more than a gloss on M'Naghten, rather
than a fundamentally new approach to the problem of criminal respon-
sibility."'73 This view forced some courts finding M'Naghten too rigid,
to look elsewhere.
In 1954, Judge Bazelon opined in Durham v. United States4 that
a defendant was not criminally responsible "if his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease or defect." This concept not only removed
the limitations which had previously burdened expert testimony, but
encouraged the psychiatrist to fully report all relevant information con-
cerning the accused's sanity.
The Durham test completely replaced M'Naghten in those juris-
dictions which adopted it. Because it deemphasized the cognitive ele-
ment, looking instead to the accused's volitional makeup on a subjective
basis, its advantages over M'Naghten were clearly apparent. However,
despite its great improvement over the M'Naghten test, Durham too
had deficiencies rendering it unacceptable. There was recognition of an
intrinsic nexus problem, which required proving that the offense com-
mitted was a product of mental disease or defect. Moreover, the lack of
tangible guidelines to aid the fact-finder was an even greater funda-
mental flaw. This resulted in the battle of the psychiatrists which had
the effect of "usurp[ing] the jury's function. 17 5 Thus, the Durham test
fell into disfavor, being rejected by all but two states. 6 Even Bazelon's
court eventually rejected the concept."
During the year preceding the pronouncement in Durham,78 a
group of medical and legal scholars began to meet in an attempt to
create a more accurate and workable definition of criminal responsibil-
73. 357 F.2d at 621.
74. 214 F.2d 862, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
75. 357 F.2d at 621. But see Blocker v. United States, 288 F.2d 853 (D.C. Cir.
1961)(Burger, J., concurring).
76. See ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 102 (1980); State v. Pike, 6 A.R. 533,
49 N.H. 399 (1870).
77. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
78. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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ity. 9 After nine years of research, drafting and revising, the American
Law Institute adopted Section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code in 1962.
This new test held an accused not responsible for criminal conduct
which, due to a mental disease or defect renders him substantially in-
capable of appreciating the criminality of his conduct or conforming
with the requirements of the law.80 The improvement over M'Naghten
appears obvious. By using the word "substantial" the test recognizes
the difficulty implicit in demanding incapacity be total in order to find
the accused criminally responsible.
The choice of the word "appreciate" rather than "know" was criti-
cal in that "mere intellectual awareness that conduct is wrongful, when
divorced from appreciation or understanding of the moral or legal im-
port of behavior, can have little significance." '81 By modifying "crimi-
nality" in this manner, ALI authors recognized the grey area dividing
the two terms with respect to the human mind.
Another area of improvement over its predecessors was the lesser
degree of importance the ALI standard placed on expert testimony.
Although psychiatric testimony is admissible whenever relevant, it does
not pretend to encroach upon the purview of the jury. Thus the pratfall
of Durham was avoided by ALI's careful elimination of rigid
classifications.
The ALI formulation "accounts for a defendant's entire mental
condition, including both cognitive and volitional capacities, and
79. This group was headed by Professors Herbert Weshcler of Columbia Univer-
sity who served as the chief reporter, and Louis B. Schwartz of the University of
Pennsylvania.
80. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (final draft 1966):
(1) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such
conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capac-
ity either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of law.
(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include an abnormality
manifested by repeated criminal or otherwise, antisocial conduct.
The drafters created a possible alternative by allowing the adopting jurisdictions to
replace the word "criminality" with "wrongfulness". See, e.g., 357 F.2d 606, 622 n.52,
wherein the court stated that "[w]e have adopted the word 'wrongfulness'. . . because
we wish to include the case where the perpetrator appreciates that his conduct is crimi-
nal, but because of a delusion, believes it to be morally justified." Id.
81. 357 F.2d at 623.
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properly recognizes that partial impairment may preclude criminal re-
sponsibility. ' 82 The recognition that a partial impairment could affect
an accused's volitional capacities was a vast improvement over
M'Naghten's total incapacity edict.
Additionally, the test is couched in simple language enabling med-
ical experts to more clearly communicate their clinical observations to
the jury.83 Because of this, the jury is able to reach its own conclusion
as to the accused's criminal responsibility, rather than accept the ex-
pert's opinion as determinative.84 Thus an additional weakness of Dur-
ham is avoided.
The Model Penal Code test is not, however, without critics. One
objection is that its "substantial impairment" requirement is vague and
therefore "susceptible to purely personal interpretation by jurors."'8 5
Judge Bazelon claims that the use of the word "result" would lead to
conclusory expert opinions in the same manner which resulted from the
product language of the Durham test.8"
Despite these criticisms, the test continues to flourish. Accepted in
the vast majority of the federal jurisdictions, 87 it is increasingly being
used to replace M'Naghten in those jurisdictions which had maintained
the older test.
Conclusion
There is little doubt that the M'Naghten test fails to adequately
consider all of those elements comprising the decision making process.
Focusing entirely on cognition, while ignoring volitional aspects of be-
havior, seems primitive in light of the current state of psychiatric sci-
ence. Because of the test's rigid limitations, defendants who are not
adjudicated insane are confined in penal institutions rather than hospi-
82. Comment, M'Naghten Rule Abandoned in Favor of "Justly Responsible"
Test for Criminal Responsibility, 14 SUFFOLK L. REV. 617, 624 (1980) (footnotes
omitted).
83. Id. at 625.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 625. See Wade v. United States, 426 F.2d 64, 77-78 (9th Cir. 1970)
(Trask, J., dissenting).
86. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (Bazelon,
C.J., concurring and dissenting).
87. See note 34 supra.
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tals. This results in untreated mentally ill people returning to society,
providing no inhibition of recidivism.
Although the Model Penal Code test is not without drawbacks, it
appears to have a more solid foundation in current medical diagnostic
ability than any other test currently used. To say that it more nearly
reflects the state of modern psychiatry than M'Naghten is an
understatement.
Because the Model Penal Code test promotes a more liberal ap-
proach in the determination of insanity, it assures that mentally infirm
defendants will receive necessary medical treatment, and juries will be
able to make more accurate and educated decisions. This serves the
needs of society to a far greater extent than does maintenance of the
current test in Florida, which, despite minor alterations, is still a woe-
fully inadequate index of criminal responsibility.
Joseph R. Dawson
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